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Capitalizing on Catastrophe

Neoliberal Strategies in Disaster Reconstruction

EDITED BY
NANDINI GUNEWARDENA AND
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CHAPTER 12

"Haiti Is Finished!"

Haiti's End of History Meets the Ends of Capitalism

MARK SCHULLER

Haiti is finished! The country is disappearing off the map.

—Joanna[1]

"HAITI IS FINISHED!" WAS A COMMON EXPRESSION AMONG HAITIAN PEOPLE DURING the two-year interim period following President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's departure from Haiti on February 29, 2004, aboard a U.S. military plane. References to Haiti's erasure off the world map provide clues to Haitian people's sense of negation as a nation subordinated to the dictates of international powers. Born from the first and only slave revolt to succeed in free nationhood, Haiti was again under foreign control in its bicentennial year. The interim period following Aristide's departure seemed to many Haitian people to signal the parallel disappearance of Haiti, from many perspectives—the loss of loved ones, livelihoods, capacity to meet subsistence needs, and the loss of their history as a nation and a society. In this chapter I refer to these subjective understandings in order to examine the events following Aristide's forced departure and their cumulative impact on Haitian society from the analytical lens of Naomi Klein's "disaster capitalism" (2005, 2007). As argued in the introduction, while they may have separate triggers, "natural disasters" and postconflict situations share much in common. As I show in this chapter, the local constraints—a delicate political situation and a government dependent on donor agencies' goodwill—as well as institutional responses are identical.

Before dawn on February 29, 2004, Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide left the country on a U.S. military plane bound for the Central African Republic. Aristide left the country following a three-week armed "insurrection" led by demobilized army members and paramilitary forces and a groundswell of street protests by an assemblage of groups that had paralyzed Pòtoprens[2] for months. Explaining or analyzing the forces that led up to Aristide's forced departure (some call it "resignation" while others call it a "modern kidnapping" or "coup d'état") is outside the scope of this chapter, and heatedly debated (e.g., Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006; Bohning 2004; Chomsky, Farmer, and Goodman 2004; Dupuy 2005; Deibert and Peck 2005; Organisation des travailleurs revolutionnaires 2005). Instead, this chapter focuses on the aftermath of this swift change. While the "Aristide question" will undoubtedly be debated for years to come, there is little disagreement among the vast majority of the Haitian people living in Haiti at the time that the two-year transition period that followed (2004–2006) was worse.

This chapter briefly outlines two deteriorations during the interim period: an increase in violence and a worsening of the economic crisis. I examine how this violent interim period set the stage for the promotion of private capital interests and the effects of the latter on everyday Haitian people struggling to make sense of the events and make ends meet. In concluding this chapter I will discuss the broader social, political, economic, and geopolitical significance of Haiti's interim context, raising concerns and issues for transnational solidarity.

I came to this study by virtue of my own lived experience as a scholar whose research and daily living were inevitably circumscribed by the events that unfolded during the period that is the subject of this chapter. While I went to Haiti to conduct dissertation research on women's nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), I could not help but notice the unfolding crisis. This subject dominated conversations I participated in—formal and informal—as well as observed. What follows is a detailed discussion coming from a multiplicity of perspectives and analyses. The information in this chapter comes from twenty-four months of participant observation in Haiti with two women's NGOs spanning the contemporary political and economic crisis, complemented by archival and interview research with governmental and international organization representatives, in Pòtoprens, Brussels, Geneva, and Washington.[3]

"EN ROUTE TO DISAPPEARING"

The day after Aristide left, a U.S.-led multinational force of around 4,500 troops came to restore order. As stipulated in the Haitian constitution, the president of the Cour de Cassation (Haiti's "Supreme Court") took his oath of office as interim president. Boniface Alexandre promised to lead Haiti through its transition to democracy, overseeing a round of elections and promising a return to peace and order. Within a week, a "Council of the Wise" was chosen by a tripartite committee named by the Aristide government, its opposition, and the international community. Given the deadlock that gripped Haitian politics, this gave effective control of the process to the international community representative, as the warring factions were likely to cancel the other's vote. According to Georges, an artist and NGO professional, "If I follow the

unfolding of the Haitian political situation, we can see that Latortue is a gift, or some kind of donation. . . . No one, nobody knows who proposed Latortue. That is, it was a proposition of some kind of dominant class." U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell admitted as much in a Fox News Channel interview: "We are working hard with the new council of eminent persons that has been created to come up with a new prime minister" (reported in AFP, March 9, 2004).

This council selected Boca Raton UN retiree Gérard Latortue as interim prime minister and approved his appointment of ministers. Latortue was widely regarded as a puppet of the international community. He was ridiculed in a popular Kanaval song in 2005, by Demele: "Haiti has two presidents. One on high and one below. One you see, one you never see. . . . One has a back, the other doesn't have a face." There are several double-entendres,[4] but the main point is that the interim government was seen as doing the bidding of the international community. Some, like Georges, explain it as a system of necessary patronage, "The prime minister and president do not speak a day without saying 'the international community.' . . . You are left with the impression that the country does not exist, cannot exist without speaking about the international community." The interim government, obliged to the international community for securing its position, was especially eager to please international organizations. International organizations seized what the Office of Transition Initiatives has called the "window of opportunity" to take charge of the rebuilding process, benefiting private capital interests in four ways. First, the interim context provided direct transfers to private multinational corporations through contracts. Second, the interim context provided inroads into structural adjustment measures. The interim government also specifically promoted privatization in a process called the CCI, the *Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire* (in English, the Interim Cooperation Framework). In addition to privatization, the plan provided legitimacy and further development of export-oriented development. Capital interests were also served by a climate of repression, of workers and other populations.

With foreign troops on the ground and a foreign-approved interim government in place, the international community was quick to promise a sure return of development aid. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) unblocked $535 million in loans and began dispersal of its first "tranche" (French for slice, as a slice of cake, also official international development terminology for conditioned portion of the total loan) in mid-2004.[5] Other private-sphere Bretton Woods groups such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) followed suit, flushing the interim government with very badly needed funds that had been held up since 2000, and in some cases, before. Soon after the installation of Latortue's government, the UN and World Bank with assistance from the IDB and the European Union (EU) organized a framework for coordinating their efforts, employing experts to prepare specific policy directives for the interim governments. The interim government compiled these reports and submitted the CCI to the international community at a donor's meeting hosted by the World Bank on July 19–20, 2004. In the next section I document people's perceptions of the interim period and their lived realities. To many people, like Joanna, playing with the French phrase of "developing country," Haiti was a country "en route to disappearing."[6]

THE END OF HAITI

The period following Aristide's forced departure was worse than its antecedent. Of the thirty-four people I interviewed who addressed the topic, everyone said that the 2004–2006 interim period was worse than even the nadir of the preceding "political crisis." In fact, only one person could remember a period in Haiti's history that was worse. In the late 1950s, François Duvalier was just consolidating power through a campaign of extermination, employing the infamous *tonton makout*—death squads personally loyal to Duvalier—to kill his enemies in the middle of the night, with corpses left hanging in public squares, when entire families were made to "disappear." As such, the notion of erasure resonates in the Haitian psyche as one that they have encountered time after time throughout the nation's history, highlighted by the proverb "the people's pencil does not have an eraser."[7] While many people were preoccupied with the immediate and unpredictable physical violence that they faced, what Paul Farmer calls "episodic violence" (2003:350), the interim period also saw a rapid deterioration in Haiti's economy—an erosion of their material quality of life, what Farmer (2004) calls "structural violence," the long-term structural forces of inequality and domination within the world system, including slavery, colonialism, and imperialism. Haiti's vulnerability to so-called natural disasters has been consequently deepened.

How Lives Are "Finished": Experiences of "Episodic Violence" in the Interim Period

Haiti's "episodic violence" framed both the media accounts—so-called mainstream and alternative sources—as well as interviews I conducted. Monique, a former factory worker currently employed as an NGO janitor, provides insight into Haitian people's internalization of violence:

> For myself, I see that things are more difficult. Because now you walk on top of cadavers. No one is spared. You go out. If you return, you say, thank you Jesus. You sleep, you wake up in your bed, thank you Jesus. Because . . . other people, who go out together disappear in the streets, in a car . . . you, you go out, you are in fear, you enter, you are in fear. You see my hair? I used to have long hair. It's this stress . . . that caused me to lose my hair. Stress.

Monique's testimony was a response to the question about the "current situation" (*sitiyasyon aktyèl*) in most of the interviews. It is possible that my presence in Haiti and role as an anthropologist might have encouraged flourish and exaggeration for rhetorical effect. However, living in Haiti it was impossible *not* to witness the deterioration. Each day as I would go to one of the NGO offices, I would walk past people living in the neighborhood huddled by a battery-powered radio, and would receive an update as to which neighborhoods were "forbidden." Some of my neighbors who had at this point stopped calling me "Blan" (Haitian term for foreigner and white person), or "My Blan," had decided that I was going to be around for a while, not leaving the country when the U.S. government asked us to (while not providing the means), and they had accepted that I was trying to help. Since they knew I was alone, and wanting to talk with people of all classes, they saw to it that I knew exactly where to avoid each day. By this time I was also relatively integrated into the two women's NGOs, and my presence didn't immediately stop or alter conversations. Neighbors' and coworkers' stories corroborated one another.

A general climate of fear and intimidation prevailed all over the city during the first half of March 2004, after the so-called rebels let everyone loose from jail while the police fled, and as they took over new territory. These fears were eventually localized following the arrival of the U.S.-led Multinational Force (MIF) that had secured areas such as the international airport, certain government buildings such as the prime minister's residence/office, and Channmas (French: Champs-de-Mars), the symbolic center of the Haitian nation that houses the National Palace. Banks were also heavily patrolled. When the Brazilian-led MINUSTAH force took over in June, they had replaced the U.S.-led MIF's occupation of buildings and makeshift camps—including former factories and hotels, as it proved more profitable for these owners to rent their space to MINUSTAH than stay open for business. It appeared to many that Brazil was serving as the proxy for the United States, serving U.S. interests. Yvette exclaims, "the Americans hide their face, they send Brazilians, Argentines . . . he's hidden but he's the one in command!"[8] This common perception was reinforced symbolically, as white armored personnel carriers and tanks that were ubiquitous in Pòtoprens and many national highways in the provinces were emblazoned with the English acronym "UN." In French, Spanish, or Portuguese, the acronym would be NU or ONU.

Following this first month, the violence was perceived to have been largely contained to certain zones, but this zone gradually grew. During this early interim period (late March–late September 2004), the violence was centered



Figure 12.1. Perimeter established by U.S. soldiers. Protests were pushed into Bel-Air. Champs-de-Mars, with the National Palace, is half a mile away, visible in the background. Photograph by Mark Schuller.

around areas of Sitesolèy and Bèlè, poor urban neighborhoods that were home to large pockets of Aristide supporters. The U.S.-led MIF had successfully contained pro-Aristide protests to Bèlè, sweeping supporters off Channmas, the national plaza (see figure 12.1). Pòtoprens residents referred to these two areas as "forbidden zones." Over time, this forbidden zone grew, enveloping Fònasyonal, Delma 2, Lasalin, Matisan, Pòsmachan, and Kafou Ayewopò.

Following a prison break on February 19, 2005, when 481 inmates fled the National Penitentiary in Pòtoprens after an armed commando—most of whom were never reapprehended—there was a distinct rise in kidnappings and overall violence. Nazon and Kafou Fèy became perennial sites of violence, followed by Delma, a mixed-income but largely middle-class suburb of Pòtoprens that housed the export-processing zone and Haiti's international airport. By the end of May 2005, the zone of violence had reached nearly all of Pòtoprens, including mixed-income neighborhoods of Kriswa and Kanape-Vèt, and the violence spiked again in July, followed by a slow rise during the election period, between November 2005 through January 2006.[9]

In addition to a spatial analysis, the rise in violence could be tracked numerically. According to the AP, "some 50 people" were killed during the four-

month period leading up to the "armed rebellion" in February 2004, which killed "about 80." By contrast, in the month of March 2004 an estimated 800 bodies were deposited at the national morgue. A single Doctors Without Borders hospital treated 2,500 gun wounds in a sixteen-month period that began in October 2004, after a violent clash involving MINUSTAH, the Haitian police, and Aristide supporters that took place on September 30, the anniversary of the 1991 coup against Aristide. An article in the *Lancet*, Britain's flagship medical journal, estimated 8,000 murders in Pòtoprens during the two-year interim period, and 35,000 incidents of sexual violence committed against women (Kolbe and Hutson 2006).

Apart from the rising number of victims of gun violence, there was also a rise in kidnappings. In 2005, kidnapping quickly became known as a "lucrative business." A Haitian colleague at a women's NGO had to flee the country because she was the only member of her family not to have been kidnapped or killed. The UN reported on the incidents with an absurd amount of precision, for example, telling people not to buy apples because someone was kidnapped while getting out of his car to buy apples. During the beginning stages, according to keen observers of the situation, people who drove new SUVs or cars or were being driven by a chauffeur were the likely targets—that is, people who appeared wealthy. However, after the ineffectual response to the prison break, no one was spared. Individuals as poor as Monique, who lived in Sitesolèy herself, became victims:

> Myself, myself. . . they pulled a gun on me. . . . Yes! I had eight, eight [Haitian][10] dollars (about one U.S. dollar) in my hand. Eight dollars to feed my children. And when they pulled the gun on me I told them I didn't have anything on me, I only have eight dollars. And they told me, you'll give me five that you have with you. I gave the five dollars, and I kept three!

Everyone that I spoke with knew someone who had been the victim of a kidnapping or an attempted kidnapping. Given the willingness on the part of kidnappers to quickly negotiate for the ransom, and given how low they were willing to negotiate, it seemed clear to everyone that an economic motivation was behind the wave of kidnapping. Mme. Auguste, an NGO veteran, recounted a story about a boy of thirteen in her neighborhood whom she asked to bring down some coconuts in a tree for her. After he came down, "like this I said, 'Here's ten goud.' He said, 'What can I do with the ten goud, why didn't you give me a gun instead?' I said, 'What will you do with the gun?' He said, 'You don't have a gun. If I had a gun I won't come to climb the coconut tree for you for ten goud, I will look for money outside.'" Many people shared this idea that the roots of the violence were economic: People needed to feed their families. An NGO director argued that this class of kidnappers was not "well integrated" into Haitian society, not knowing who and where to target, because the political and economic elites remained for the most part unscathed (Schuller 2006b). In addition, according to secondhand accounts, many kidnappers spoke English, suggesting involvement by U.S. deportees, averaging more than thirty per month—some of whom had never seen Haiti—following the PATRIOT Act.

Setting Up the Finish

The episodic violence that Haitian people experienced during the 2004–2006 interim period was compounded and reproduced by the steady deterioration of Haiti's economy and decline in the material quality of life, an aspect of what Farmer calls "structural violence" (2004). One of the primary indicators of the economic problems was a loss of factory jobs. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs and several NGO employees, while there were approximately 20,000 jobs in the fall of 2003, before the triggering of the episodic violence, there were only an estimated 12,000–14,000 left by the middle of 2005. A brief discussion and explanation for this loss of jobs is below. Even those who were fortunate enough to keep a paying job in the formal sector (5–15 percent of the population, depending on estimates) found it difficult to cope with the substantial price hikes in staple goods like rice, corn, beans, and oil during this period.[11] In the mixed, middle-income neighborhood where I lived, a *gwo mamit* (coffee can) of Haitian rice used to sell for 75 goud (while "Miami rice"—imported from the United States—sold for 50 goud) at the beginning of 2004. At the beginning of 2005, it sold for 125 goud. A *ti mamit* (soup can) of Haitian black beans used to sell for 40 goud (more than the imported beans at 30 goud), but it became 60 goud. Prices were lower if bought in large quantities closer to the port. While there are usually several exchanges from the port to the neighborhood, with each person taking a small profit from which to live, including a few goud to pay for a tap-tap ("public" transport[12]), the system is normally remarkably "efficient" in economic terms, distributing goods quickly, and relatively cheaply, as far as possible and to as many people as possible (Fass 1988). But this market system collapsed during the interim period, as several merchants in the neighborhood closed shop because they could not afford to buy the higher-priced goods, or their customers could not afford to buy what they sold. Operating on the margins of society, many in this class that normally barely eked out a living fell below starvation levels.[13]

In part, the rise in prices for primary subsistence goods resulted from increases in fuel prices. In January 2003, the IMF forced the Aristide government to stop subsidizing the cost of fuel, and this crippled the system, operating as it was with very little profit margin. Prices for a tap-tap ride within a single route shot up from three to five goud at that time. The fare for one "course"

(equivalent to a route) for taxis, where as many as six adults or teenage schoolchildren would share the car and be deposited where they needed to, also doubled, from seven to fifteen goud. During the 2004–2006 crisis, fares increased twice, to as much as ten goud for a tap-tap and twenty-five goud for a taxi.[14] In addition to the rise in prices for staple goods and transport during this period, housing costs skyrocketed in all but the most impacted neighborhoods (such as Bèlè and Sitesolèy). In the twelve months following Aristide's departure, many rents doubled in my mixed-income neighborhood, forcing several people to relocate to neighborhoods such as Bèlè that were slowly vacated as the violence deteriorated. Several NGO staff and factory workers also reported that their rent in other relatively safe neighborhoods shot up as much as 150 to 250 percent.[15] Yvette, who was evicted, exclaimed,

> Consider that there are people who live in an apartment building for years. Some who have lived here for ten years, fifteen years, eight years. Now the owner of the building gives them a paper to tell everyone to look for another house for them to live in. He's going to rent the building to give MINUSTAH for $1,000 U.S. per month.

Without exception, members of Haiti's lower classes that I talked to who owned their homes lived in violence-prone shantytowns such as Sitesolèy. I know several people who moved into these areas during the interim period because their housing costs became too expensive. As a result, people living in places like Sitesolèy, such as Monique or Solange, a factory worker making the minimum wage of seventy goud ($1.80) per day, are forced to face daily violence because of their poverty: "In my neighborhood, people who had the ability to leave, they left. People who remained, they have no choice. It wasn't good, but now things are really bad."

As demonstrated above, there was a correlation between the complex sociopolitical crisis and rising prices for housing. These increases benefited a small percentage of landowners. While some commentators have praised Haiti's informal housing market, unencumbered by legislation, as being one of the most effective, efficient, and fair in the world (de Soto 2000), a closer ethnographic look demands attention to the fact that the vast majority of people of a certain class (janitor, factory worker, street merchant, or day laborer) do not own even their ramshackle, eight-foot-square cinder block and patched-tin-roof houses. Approximately 95 percent of the people I spoke with in these economic brackets rent their house or patch of land upon which they are responsible for building a structure. While it might be true that some of their landlords originate from a similar class, being lucky enough to squat on empty land before the massive urban migration in the 1980s,[16] most of the land in Pòtoprens is controlled by middle- or upper-income people, some of whom like my landlord live outside Haiti. Traditional Haitian status divisions defined urban dwellers as elites.

As just shown, the interim period in Haiti following Aristide's departure was one of the worst in Haiti's history, marked by a rise and spread of violence, including kidnapping. Structuring this violence was a steady deterioration in the economic situation. Many people in Haiti voiced this unease by the phrase "Haiti is finished!" In the next section of the chapter I will explore the capitalist entrees into Haiti's deteriorating situation.

CAPITALIST ENDS

> It is because [foreign powers] have interests in this insecurity, Mark. If they didn't have interests in it, they would have brought about peace.
>
> —Yvette

At first blush, this passage, suggesting that the international community had interests in the violence, might seem shocking to readers from the United States or other northern countries, or it might seem to reflect a certain paranoia typical of the "Haitian mentality" (cf. Heinl, Heinl, and Heinl 1996; Gold 1991). If not paranoia, then the passage might seem to reflect at the very least propaganda or ideological spin.[17] However, Yvette's is a common perception among people with whom I spoke. Yvette continued: "Those bandits, where did they find their weapons? The police say that they don't have munitions, the country has an arms embargo. . . . But the bandits, they find the munitions. Where do they find them? In Haiti do they produce them?" This selection asks questions, both difficult and compelling: How did the arms get in the hands of bandits?[18] What interests would the international community have in the violence? The remainder of this chapter is an attempt to answer this last question.

CCI: The Finished Product

Aristide's sudden departure provided international financial institutions with the opportunity to convene and coordinate their political and economic agenda for Haiti through the CCI process. As noted in the introduction to the volume, the World Bank candidly argued that "the weakened capacity of government often found in postconflict settings magnifies the need for an external aid coordination role" (World Bank 1998:24–25). According to all but one of the donor representatives I interviewed in Pòtoprens, Brussels, and Washington, the CCI is an unparalleled success, a groundbreaking new era in cooperation, especially for a postconflict situation. In addition to the coordinated plan and donor pledges—amounting to just over a billion dollars over a period originally specified for two years—the CCI also calls for a collaborative, donor-led process of implementation

with the interim government with different donors leading work groups based on their interests and expertise. For example, the World Bank led the team charged with economic governance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with HIV/AIDS, and the EU with education.

The process began at a meeting in Washington on April 22. A team of 250 experts, most of them foreign, went to work assembling a plan, charged with meeting with representatives of Haitian "civil society." As I argued elsewhere (Schuller 2007), the term civil society is ideologically loaded. In Haiti's contemporary context, it was taken up by Aristide's opposition in the ideological struggle (Jean 2002:32). A list of 168 Haitian civil society groups that participated in this process appeared in the annex of the CCI (Interim Cooperation Framework 2004). One group was listed twice, and several umbrella organizations were listed along with constituent members, padding the numbers. A close reading of the titles of the groups suggests that the Group of 184, Aristide's civil society opposition, notably organizations comprising bourgeois interests of the private sector, were overrepresented, 32 of 168 groups.[19] In addition, at least 29 of the groups were foreign, some of them even governmental agencies such as Sweden's International Development Agency. Within a period of three weeks, documents were prepared and assembled into a single document that interim prime minister Latortue presented at a donors' conference hosted by the World Bank on July 19–20, 2004.

The CCI promised a large and specified amount of aid that was not met. This document highlighted almost a billion dollars in unmet financial need. The donors pledged this billion dollars over the interim period, at the time specified to the middle of 2006, by which time a new, constitutionally elected government would have had six months in office after its inauguration on February 7. Despite the pledges, and their relatively widespread dissemination, the funds have been slow to arrive. While it was still possible to view web pages offering exact pledges, the CCI, and documents leading up to the CCI at the time of the submission of this chapter, no such information was available about implementation, funds spent, and results or evaluation.[20] On the assumption that released funds would have been covered in local media following a publicity effort by the donor agency, I developed a spreadsheet of CCI funds pledged and dispersed. While bilateral donors such as the United States and Canada gave funds to the interim government in 2004, it was difficult to track what exactly was part of the CCI process. In addition, in 2004, the IDB had begun disbursing a portion of loans it had earlier approved under Aristide. While individual governments, such as the United States, Canada, and France fronted Latortue's government with grants early on, funds for the CCI mainly trickled in after January 2005, from the World Bank, after the interim government paid $52.7 million in arrears. The World Bank began the process for disbursing $73 million for "economic governance" on January 6, 2005. Other donor agencies slowly followed suit. By October 2005, almost twenty months after Aristide left and fifteen months after pledges were made, less than a third ($324 million of $1,084 million) was disbursed (IMF 2005b:28).

By way of explanation, the EU representative pointed to the slow, deliberative process of the EU, itself an experiment in multilateral cooperation (interview with author, June 2005). Some people at the World Bank said that the slowness was expected. Some at USAID pointed their finger at other agencies, saying that the U.S. government has kept its promises. Others at USAID, along with staff at the IMF and IDB, argued that the issue at hand was really Haiti's "absorptive capacity." Whatever the reason, the effect has been that very little of the promised improvements have been made. Route National #1 just outside of Gonayiv was submerged under a new lake nine months after Tropical Storm Jeanne struck, and repair work was only begun in the summer of 2006, two years after the storm (see figure 12.2).

The CCI has been severely criticized by Haitian NGOs as being an attempt from foreign powers to take over. Interestingly, seven groups that were listed as participants also denounced the process as representing a loss of sovereignty, as an attempt by the international organizations to obtain greater control. At least one of the organizations listed as a "participant" in the CCI



Figure 12.2. Damage to National Route #1 nine months after Tropical Storm Jeanne. Photograph by Mark Schuller.

process was only sent a single invitation letter for a meeting that staff did not attend. An ad hoc coalition of forty-four organizations pointed out that the process was rushed and coercive: "The CCI's approach concretely reflects the reality of the occupation of our territory by foreign military forces" (SOFA, PAPDA, and SAKS 2004:3). These groups that were considered "partners" in the process critiqued it for being roughshod; lacking meaningful dialogue and participation; having no mechanisms in place for debate and not enough time to discuss; excluding Kreyòl, the only language of 90 percent of Haiti's population; and lacking a real dissemination plan (SOFA, PAPDA, and SAKS 2004:4). Two years following the CCI's passage, a civil society coalition decried the process for its continuing lack of transparency and true participation (CoHE and CoEH 2006). As a result, the process rubber-stamped and gave legitimacy to the interests of the international community, who spent almost $2 million employing the 250 experts, the vast majority of whom were foreign. The plan itself is a vast assemblage of propositions that have been long promulgated by the international community, many of them not specific to Haiti. A coalition argued, "Haiti isn't Afghanistan, nor Liberia, and still less Iraq. One has to avoid the 'ready-to-wear' solutions and procedures that elsewhere in certain national contexts have led to relentless failures" (SOFA, PAPDA, and SAKS 2004:3). The sections that follow will outline these "ready-to-wear" solutions, the first of which is privatization.

Contracting the Finish: Privatization

Privatization was mentioned several times in the CCI as paving the way to development (Interim Cooperation Framework 2004:19, 23, 24, 28). This echoes Latortue's public promotions of privatization. At a Caribbean conference held in Miami on December 8, 2004, and again at a conference held in Haiti the following week, Latortue said that Haiti needs to get over this notion that privatization is a "mortal sin," and vowed to do better to privatize the Haitian government's industries, such as electricity, power, and water.[21] State-owned enterprises in service provision (e.g., water, electricity, telecommunications, ports) generate a half billion dollars annually. For example, in 2000, public services generated 8,311.4 million goud in revenue, or $476 million (IMF 2002:42–47). Publicly owned enterprises are among the only productive resources remaining in southern countries like Haiti, the only surplus value to extract from a country already devastated by environmental destruction and centuries of underdevelopment. The interim government also laid the groundwork for privatizing the phone company, and even gave the rights to Columbian contact-period archaeological resources to a foreign company. A former ambassador and high-ranking Aristide government official now critical of Aristide stated that it was clear that this interim period was a context for more and deeper control by foreigners (interview with author, December

2005). Interestingly, these moves toward privatization run counter to warnings by the World Bank (1998:34).[22]

A project outlined by the CCI and taken up by the U.S. government was temporary electricity provision (Interim Cooperation Framework 2004:23). Providing electricity in urban areas, particularly those prone to violent conflict, was outlined as a step in providing security (OTI websites). Given this, and that institutional reinforcement is seen as a key to successful development in the new focus on fragile states (World Bank 1998:2; USAID 2005d:5), it would have made sense that the CCI's plan, short-lived as it was, focus on developing the institutional capacity of the state-run electric company, EDH. The opposite took place. The U.S. government gave support to a multinational corporation, Alstom Power, which has large operations in the U.S. Gulf Coast, to ship in large generators to provide electricity for Pòtoprens using a U.S. petroleum distributor, Texaco, to provide the carburant. In addition, contracts were drawn for permanent privatization. Since the revenues barely passed through the government-run EDH, service provision was anything but sustainable. For example, a USAID contract expired on March 1, 2005. At least Pòtoprens was without power for a week afterward, despite a steady six-to-ten-hour daily ration for the weeks leading up to this date. Now that the transition period is over, the same situation might again arise once the CCI funds run out, or it is possible that future aid is contingent on privatizing EDH. During president Rene Préval's first term (1996–2001), multinational organizations successfully obtained the privatization of cement industries as promised by the Governor's Island Accord (Clement 1997:34).

In the abstract, especially to a northern audience that has been familiarized with privatization of public utilities, this move might appear banal, especially given Haiti's ranking in 2005 as the "most corrupt" country in the world by Transparency International's "corruption perception index." In fact, privatization of public utilities would be disastrous to Haiti's poor majority. First of all, prices for these daily basic needs would almost certainly increase, pricing it beyond the means of Haiti's poor majority (80 percent live within a budget of $2 per day or less). For example, monthly local phone service is 225 goud, or $6.25. For those with a tap, water for households is $14.89 per month. While critiques of state-run utilities come from all sectors, business and hotel owners have been particularly vocal and prolific, arguing that they should receive more than residential clients and neighborhoods. Blackouts were a fact of life in Pòtoprens during the research period. But they affected everyone, not just well-to-do people and businesses that own diesel-powered generators. And a public utility has responsibility to provide service to *all* of the public.

This responsibility is eroding under a logic of privatization. On invitation from the neighborhood association, I visited a shantytown just outside of Pétion-Ville, a wealthy suburb of Pòtoprens, that was only added to the electric grid and received electricity after a long organizing campaign by its neighborhood association. When the transformer blew, a representative from the interim government told this community of 10,000 people that they will never have electricity because it was not a good "return on their investment." Privatization will only further concentrate these public goods in the hands of the well-to-do. Water is an even more dire concern—already it is a service that few Haitian households have regular access to.[23] The majority of Haiti's people have a daily chore of walking up to 20 minutes to the nearest tap (if there is one in the area), where usually they have to buy the not-completely-treated water for as much as five goud per gallon.

Structuring the Finish: Structural Adjustment

In addition to process and privatization, progressive Haitian NGOs have other criticisms of the CCI. While there were some positive aspects according to these groups, such as gesturing toward women's equality and decentralization, two main pillars triggered heated criticism. The "economic governance" plan simply legitimated de facto World Bank and IMF control over the country's finances and planning. While some of the specifics may prove helpful in the long run, like tighter financial accounting measures, the overall plan keeps more power in the hands of international organizations to set priorities through control of the state's finances.[24] According to Yvette, "they are just selling the country wholesale to the *blan* (Haitian term for foreigner) . . . and our leaders accept." Joanna, an activist and women's NGO employee, argued, "In the IMF's and World Bank's structural adjustment plan, you will find with every government that comes to power, more and more, they support the IMF's and World Bank's plan."

The CCI also promises Haiti's cooperation in structural adjustment measures: "The Government is also committed to developing a plan for the clearance of external arrears and ensuring regular debt service" (Interim Cooperation Framework 2004:23). Haiti's external debt was estimated at $1.4 billion at the end of the transition period, with rising debt service projections: $56.3 million for fiscal year 2005, and $58.3 million for fiscal year 2009 (IMF 2005a:27–28). While this figure seems small compared to some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, forcing Haiti to continue repaying the debt deprives Haiti's people of services (Schuller 2006a). In 2003, Haiti's scheduled debt service was $57.4 million, whereas the entire foreign pledges for education, health care, environment, and transportation combined was $39.21 million (IMF 2005a:88; World Bank 2002:vii). In part because of this debt, 500,000 children do not have access to school, and only 35 percent finish primary school (Interim Cooperation Framework 2004:33). Structural adjustment measures include such direct, forced reduction in social spending. In 2000–2001, the IMF demanded that Haiti reduce its social spending from 3 percent of the gross internal product to 2 percent (Duhaime 2002). In addition to direct cuts, international financial institutions have demanded user fees for services such as education and health care. Education is one of the primary expenses for a family. The average cost of registration and tuition for a low-end Pòtoprens school[25] was 4,000–4,500 goud a year, about three months' salary working minimum wage.[26]

On April 14, 2006, following the election of President Préval, the World Bank announced that Haiti would be eligible for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program. The HIPC program is a formula for debt cancellation, approved en masse after a proposal at the July 2005 G8 meetings in Gleneagles, Scotland.[27] The earliest Haiti could receive debt cancellation, assuming a best-case scenario, is 2009. Staff at international institutions I interviewed did not know why the boards of directors of their institutions had not approved Haiti before this time. Haitian NGO employees theorized that it was part of their plan to bring Haiti to the brink of disaster by starving Aristide,[28] and as discussed above, the interim government was quick to do the international agencies' bidding and hence did not raise this issue. In the meantime, Haiti will be paying more than $220 million in debt service. The HIPC program requires that a country successfully implement an IMF staff-monitored program for a period of at least two years. This is the context in which structural adjustment measures (now called Poverty Reduction Plans or Development Policy Loans) are imposed. Another condition is the World Bank's acceptance of the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the context in which a host of other neoliberal measures are imposed.

Finishing the Peasantry: Other Neoliberal Measures

A third plan within the CCI is a traditional part of the "ready-to-wear" neoliberal program. The proposal for agriculture and food security was a further recitation of globalization, with high-value crops for exports, benefiting few Haitian farmers, and importation of subsidized or monetized (PL-480) rice, draining Haitian peasants' productive capacity to feed Haiti (Richardson and Grassroots International 1997). U.S. "food security" policy has destroyed national production in two ways, by flooding the market with subsidized U.S. agricultural products, underselling the Haitian peasantry, and by the trade liberalization measures tied to receipt of food aid, for example, removal of protective tariffs (ibid.). Once an exporter of rice, Haiti is now unable to feed itself, producing only 18 percent of rice consumed, importing $200 million per year (MOREPLA and PAPDA 2004). In addition, the interim government authorized T&S Rice, a U.S. company, to operate in Haiti and increase rice imports, further weakening Haiti's national production. According to a national

coalition and campaign, this move will cost 28,000 jobs (2004:2). Continuing and providing legitimation for these neoliberal policies for food security, an explicit goal in the CCI is to further integrate Haiti into regional markets via the Free Trade Area of Americas (Interim Cooperation Framework 2004:25). The plan for agriculture in the CCI proposes the promotion of specialty items for consumption in the U.S. market—a long-standing USAID platform (e.g., USAID 1997)—instead of for national production and consumption. This export orientation in formal development policy did not begin in the 1980s with USAID, but during the beginning of the "Development Encounter" (Escobar 1995). The first UN mission to Haiti in 1948 outlined coffee export as a primary motor of Haiti's development (UN 1949). As the ad hoc group of progressive NGOs argued, the best produce gets shipped out, benefiting the United States with cheaper exotic produce, and benefiting a small percentage of Haitian farmers (UNNOH, SOFA, and PAPDA 2004). Over time, this globalization of agriculture has destroyed national production. Joanna expressed the frustration of many others:

> We used to have Creole pigs, they destroyed that. We used to have factories that used to make tomato paste, they destroyed that. We had factories that used to make milk, they destroyed that. Well, we used to have factories that made sugar, they destroyed that. Let me ask you a question, Mark. If they are truly helping us, if it's aid they give us, why don't they rather support our national production, so they can assure that the money, it goes toward production?

The monetization further accelerates both capital flow out of the country and a growing imbalance between rich and poor within Haiti. Neoliberal agricultural measures were a primary "push" factor in the massive urbanization in the 1980s, creating in Marxist terms a "reserve army" of unemployed—the lumpenproletariat—justifying low-wage industrial jobs as beneficial to this desperate and vulnerable population (DeWind and Kinley 1988; Trouillot 1994). The interim period provided the finishing touches on this form of exploitation.

Finishing Touches on Exploitation: Workers' Rights in the Interim Context

Another plan within the CCI was to create more free trade zones, exploiting Haiti's "comparative advantage" of extremely low wages (the minimum wage is 70 goud, or about $1.80 per day) and proximity to the United States (Interim Cooperation Framework 2004:9). The creation of a free trade zone in August 2003 with a $20 million World Bank (International Finance Corporation, private sector unit) loan provided jobs to some 1,000 people in a poor, often-abandoned part of the country, in Wanament, on the border with the Dominican Republic. Workers were to have been guaranteed the right to unionize as well as other protections as part of international law, maintaining minimum labor standards. However, these de jure protections were violated several times by the Dominican owners, CODEVI.

On March 1, 2004, the day after Aristide left the country, the Dominican owners of CODEVI fired 34 workers without citing cause. This private company used soldiers from the Dominican Army to enforce such a measure on Haitian soil.[29] Workers believed that the company was targeting members of SOKOWA, an independent union, organizing to defend their rights and stop employer abuses (interviews with author, July 2004). On June 11, 2004, the company again fired 370 suspected union members following a strike and lockout. Credible evidence was amassed by three observer missions to the Wanament free trade zone, including a team I helped to organize, a team of Haitian doctors, and a team of low-level government functionaries, that workers were injected with birth control without their knowledge in the guise of a tetanus vaccination. They were given shots from two flasks, one clear and one milky. One such woman lost her fetus in her eighth month, after the second vaccination. Three other women also lost their fetuses, and two other women and a man became sterile following this second vaccination. Despite this evidence, including testimony and written documentation from public health officials in the area's public hospital, the interim government did nothing about it. Workers believed that the interim government did not protect them because they were serving the interests of the foreign owners and the World Bank (interviews with author, July 2004).

Even acknowledging this situation to be somewhat extreme, the political situation was one in which a climate of repression and intimidation of factory workers thrived. As mentioned above, the number of factory jobs declined in the interim period, from 20,000 to an estimate of 14,000. While it may be argued that the factory owners and the other dominant class, large merchants, were merely reacting to the violence by protecting their investments, and thus decapitalizing the country, these classes had received substantial gains during the interim period. In March of 2004, the new government announced that the largest industries and merchants would be exempt from paying taxes for a three-year period. It was among the first acts of the interim government. This, combined with their failure to protect workers in the highly visible campaign just discussed, gave employers the clear message that the interim government was acting to promote their interests, protecting their property and allowing them to oppress workers with impunity. While the prices for basic goods and services have risen since the end of 2003, wages have not increased. However distraught this made Haitian workers, the top concern that most of them had was the climate of fear in the factories. When I asked why they did not speak up, and why the situation deteriorated so much, several people gave me the

same answer: The owners know they have the upper hand. They could, like CODEVI, just fire everyone or all suspected union members, and replace them with others eagerly awaiting the chance to work. Yolette explained, "They don't want unions in Haiti. When you have a union, they destroy it. They fire everyone who is working because of the union." Solange decried, "The work they give out, it goes away . . . they don't need you! Why? They always know they will find someone else outside." As several workers told me, "There are 50,000 people behind you" waiting for the same job.

It has been suggested that the violence on the streets was the major cause of owners' closure of factories. This discourse has facilitated policy recommendations and further concessions to this class. For example, Senator Mike Dewine authored the Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity Act (HERO) that would extend free trade privileges of tax exemption to owners of textile processing factories. Dewine first authored the act in 2003 (S. 2261, 108th Congress), but following the political and economic crisis of 2004, the Senate unanimously voted its passage on July 16, following amendments proposed by Bill Frist, just days before the Washington donors' conference where the CCI was ratified. The unanimity in which the Senate passed the bill could be interpreted as a united attempt by the U.S. people to help Haiti following its turbulent history. Or it could also be read as an attempt to protect U.S. cotton and manufacturing interests, preempting the World Trade Organization's (WTO) ruling lifting the quota on Chinese textiles, which went into effect on January 1, 2005. Immediately, this WTO decision impacted textile markets worldwide, including Haiti, possibly equally or more significant to the loss of jobs than the street violence that escalated during the same time. Interestingly, the Senate recalled the bill from the House on September 14. The bill was again proposed in 2005, in Congress's new session, renamed HOPE, and passed in December 2006, one of the last acts of the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress.

With language identical to the free-trade bill proposed following the Sri Lankan tsunami discussed in Gunewardena's chapter, the HERO Act exploits a vulnerable situation, advancing a neoliberal reform agenda at the expense of Haiti's sovereignty. It contains a condition that Haiti must not "engage in activities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests"—Section (d)(2). In order to receive tax benefits in the bill, the Haitian government must establish or make progress toward "elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment" (Section [d][1][C]) like "the provision of national treatment and measures to create an environment conducive to domestic and foreign investment." Interpreting this mandate is left to the U.S. president, who has the authority to certify whether or not Haiti is making progress on these and other issues, such as human rights, national security, and border policing.

All this is not to say that people are not in need of more jobs; in fact, it was the primary concern and priority expressed in most of the interviews with people coming from Haiti's lower urban status groups. However, this felt need and desperation to stimulate new jobs does not rationalize the specifics of the HOPE Act. Nor does it address the structural underpinnings of Haiti's urban poverty—the destruction of national production Joanna discussed above. Pòtoprens's teeming shantytowns, the perennial site of violence during the interim period, were necessitated by the creation of the export-processing zone in the 1970s and 1980s (DeWind and Kinley 1988; Maternowska 2006). The sector's instability and short-term orientation are obvious to people I interviewed, as are their contributions to the current outcropping of "episodic violence." Even if the policy did not give perks to Haitian and American textile interests in addition to defending U.S. trade and geopolitical interests, the HERO/HOPE Act bears striking resemblances to these original policies. Criticizing this short-term development strategy, a network of both European and Haitian NGOs cited Haiti's minister of finance in saying that export-processing industries are "the sector with the least value added and the lowest annual wage" (CoEH and CoHE 2006:2).

The CCI is also notable in its silences. Despite its specificity in pointing to Aristide government abuses, and a vast collection of human development indexes, the CCI does not offer statistics on the concentration of wealth in the hands of a very privileged few in Haiti, the second-most unequal country in the world (Jadotte 2006). As such, the question of the link between Haiti's extreme inequality and underdevelopment never arises, and so solutions do not get posed. The link between neoliberal measures and the destruction of national production is similarly silenced. Also not mentioned was the external debt, except to mandate Haiti's dutiful payment of regular debt service.

At a 2002 conference in Monterrey, Mexico, President Bush said, "we must tie greater aid to political and legal and economic reforms" (cited in USAID, 2006 Budget Justification). As just shown, the CCI process is a perfect example of this. Multinational agencies took more of a direct control of the process, promoting a three-week "participatory" framework in which local organizations were used for legitimacy. Georges said, "The donor, when he[30] gives some money, he does not give it in the function of your priorities that you defined. He gives the money in the function in his vision, in his perceptions." This chapter has outlined four capitalist agendas promoted by the interim context and justified by the donor-led CCI process. The plan promoted, funded, and coordinated by international agencies is a purer form of neoliberalism rejected by Haiti's people and at least resisted by Haiti's elected governments: privatization, free-trade zones, export-oriented agriculture, and a monetized food aid that erodes national productive capacity and deepens dependency.

BEYOND HAITI

Journalist Don Bohning declared that maybe the time has come for an international protectorate to take over, because of continual state failure (2004). A self-fulfilling prophecy, the discourse of Haiti being a failed state has already become reality. As mirrored by mainstream media coverage, Haiti is usually treated as a special, isolated case, a phenomenon known by scholars as "Haitian exceptionalism." As many scholars have pointed out (Lawless 1992; Farmer 2003), Haiti is often known by its superlatives: The first and only slave revolt to succeed in forging a free nation, Haiti is now the "poorest country in the hemisphere." I argued in this chapter that what seems like exceptionalism is rather clarity or precocity. As such, the seemingly endless crises, violence, and environmental degradation are not expressions of an incomprehensibly backward Haitian mentality but rather a clear example and early warning of what might happen to other heavily indebted, low-income countries in other parts of the world if significant changes are not made to the system. I have argued that the 2004–2006 crisis in Haiti is best understood as an early warning for, and clear example of, disaster capitalism.

As I have argued in this chapter, Haiti's political and economic crisis has been employed/exploited to benefit capital interests in several ways. Local elites have rolled back gains made by workers, peasants, and urban poor. Landlords in mixed-income neighborhoods doubled their rents. Large merchants have received a three-year tax exemption. Haitian factory owners have received these and other tax privileges. But foreign capital interests have benefited even greater: The interim government guaranteed structural reforms such as privatization, structural adjustment, and trade liberalization, both through the process of CCI and through the larger geopolitical environment in the interim period. The interim government has invited and legitimated greater foreign control of Haitian development policy. Definitive steps were taken to privatize remaining state-run utilities, and during the interim context private corporations secured contracts for management and service delivery. Other measures such as economic restructuring were taken, such as new finance legislation, benefiting financial capital. The interim government dutifully repaid the investors of the World Bank, IMF, and IDB at the same time as the tsunami-stricken countries were promised debt cancellation. The CCI also promised Haiti's further integration into the world economy through export-processing industrialization, export-oriented agriculture, and reduction in trade barriers. Haiti is being finished, en route to disappearing, through disaster capitalism.

CONTESTING THE FINISH: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Haiti's popular movement—vibrant, creative, defiant, and contradictory (Bell 2001; Racine 1999; Smith 2001)—was weakened, confused, and divided by the abrupt change in government on the leap year day. But despite the violence—both episodic and structural—and despite the foreign occupation, individuals and groups have been challenging disaster capitalism mentioned in this chapter. Three such movements are especially worth mentioning, offering lessons for northern solidarity movement actors.

In January 2006, following a sustained, year-and-a-half transnational organizing campaign, CODEVI finally recognized SOKOWA and agreed to several conditions that SOKOWA had pushed for, including a gradual increase in salary and reinstatement of any union member who wished to return. Workers kept pressure on Haiti's government, especially local branches, taking their case to Haiti's courts, and achieved step-by-step gains. Workers organized alternative sources of revenue for union members thrown out, and communicated their demands to the Dominican owners and to the world through their union, Batay Ouvriye. In an especially bitter and polarized political field, Batay Ouvriye and their northern partners such as the Haiti Support Group were able to keep pressure on the World Bank and the northern companies, including Levi's and Sara Lee, makers of Hanes, to enforce their codes of conduct to protect the workers.

Following nine months of street protests and bridging political divides (between several factions of Aristide's opposition and Aristide supporters), an ad hoc group of activists were able to secure a decrease in gas prices. They had attained promises that were later broken by the interim government to name a commission to explore the issue. President-elect Préval met with Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez to enter into Petro Caribé, securing lower gas prices for Haiti. In August 2006, Haiti's Parliament overwhelmingly ratified Petro Caribé. As mentioned above, public transport prices returned to pretransition levels for most local routes (five goud).

Finally, two coalitions formed in 2003–2004 to debate and propose alternative development proposals, arguing for land reform, debt cancellation, national production, and worker protection. While the origins of the two coalitions are serendipitous, both groups gained traction through their opposition to the CCI process and proposals. As a result of publicizing what they are against, they are now exploring and creating what they are for. Drawing inspiration from the World Social Forum, one such coalition published a treatise, "Yon Lòt Ayiti Posib" (Another Haiti is Possible) in December 2004, offering a road map of alternatives, an exit strategy for globalization and disaster capitalism. In response to a question about how we northern citizens can help Haiti, ending the interview, Marie, a former factory worker currently engaged in microcommerce said, "Before you can talk about helping Haiti, the best way you can help us in Haiti is to bring back democracy to Washington."

NOTES

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1. Names are pseudonyms, to protect their individual and organizational identities. Quotations translated from original Kreyòl.
2. I am using the Kreyòl spelling for place names, not the French. "Port-au-Prince" is Pòtoprens.
3. In all, I formally interviewed twenty-one staff and eight clients at one NGO, twenty-two staff and eleven clients at the other, nine Haitian government staff, eight international NGO representatives, twelve donor representatives in Haiti, and twenty-one donor representatives at their international headquarters.
4. These include "pa gen fas" (does not have a face), referring to Boniface, poking fun at his physical appearance.
5. Date is uncertain, because funds were released in 2004 following Latortue's inauguration; however the IDB website states that funds were released in November 2003, when Aristide still was in office. In fact, this is only the date when the Aristide government paid off its final arrears.
6. "Pays en voie de disparition."
7. *Kreyon pèp la pa gen gonm.*
8. An October 2005 interview with a USAID retiree confirmed that it was a deliberate U.S. strategy to have Brazil take the lead.
9. According to one report, the violence spiked in July-August 2005, at 242 officially-recorded deaths of civilian, police, or UN troops (RNDDH 2006:2).
10. The concept of the "Haitian dollar"—one dollar per five goud, Haiti's official currency, began because the exchange rate was fixed until after the fall of Duvalier in the late 1980s, when Finance Minister Delatour floated Haiti's currency at the behest of the IMF. Eight "Haitian dollars" was about one U.S. dollar at the time of the interview.
11. The annual growth in the Consumer Price Index in 2003 was 39.3 percent (World Bank 2005a).
12. The "public" transport was actually a privately owned, publicly regulated system, where routes and fairs were established by the Ministry of Transport, usually in consultation with the Union of Drivers and Car Owners.
13. For example, I knew three children who died from malnutrition.
14. Prices stabilized as of January 2007, in part resulting from the Petro Caribé agreement discussed below: five goud per tap-tap and twenty goud for a taxi.
15. According to people I have interviewed, rents even went up in more violence-prone areas such as Kafou Fèy and Kafou Ayewopò.

16. This migration was itself triggered by a complex array of push and pull factors, neoliberal policies pushed by international agencies and consented to by Jean-Claude Duvalier (Maternowska 2006).
17. Interestingly, Yvette is *not* one of Aristide's supporters, proposing a return to the Haitian Army that Aristide dismantled. The army was created as an act of the U.S. Congress during the 1915–1934 U.S. occupation of Haiti, and historically served primarily to control the population, propping up a string of dictators. The army was in firm control after Jean-Claude Duvalier left, ending a twenty-nine-year father-and-son dictatorship, and again after a coup against Aristide on September 30, 1991.
18. To this I would add, the former army and even police with the international arms embargo.
19. The Group of 184 itself lists umbrella organizations as well as individual members. There are far fewer than 184 organizations that can be called members.
20. The IMF published a partial accounting of the funds in a November (2005b) report.
21. There was also an exploration of foreign governments collecting customs duties as ships left their ports, after the interim government shut down provincial ports, triggering a strike by dock workers. In 2007, at the behest of the international community, the elected government of Preval-Alexis began steps to privatize the phone company, TELECO.
22. "As the Cambodia and Haiti case studies show, the norms of behavior of the private sector and the degree of corruption and cronyism within or between the private and public sectors may be such that privatization may well not enhance the prospects for sustained, equitable development, and may even make them worse."
23. Only 8.7 percent of Haitian households have a tap—a fifth (20.7 percent) visit a public fountain, and a fifth (19.4 percent) buy their water. By far the most accessed source is the river—with 34.3 percent (IHSI 2001).
24. During the years following the 1994 return of Aristide, 90 percent of Haiti's governmental budget was financed externally (Morton 1997:1).
25. I do not have data for rural schools.
26. This includes private as well as public schools. Eighty percent of Haiti's schoolchildren go to private school (Interim Cooperation Framework 2004:33).
27. Haiti was not on the list of HIPC-eligible countries in this proposal.
28. Scheduled payments—a higher number than the actual disbursements, especially after donors withheld promised aid pending resolution of Haiti's political crisis—went down from $188.3 million disbursed in FY 2001, $142.59 in 2002, $96.36 in 2003, and $80.34 in 2004 (World Bank 2002:vii).
29. After the flight of Haitian police following the armed insurrection, these demobilized Haitian Army members and Dominican Army soldiers patrolled the area, violating Haiti's sovereignty.
30. In Haitian Kreyòl, "li" means he, she, or it. I am gendering donors as male to make the sentence read more clearly, and given the implied contextual personification. I could use "they," but I am also deliberately gendering donors within the male sphere, as Haitian interview subjects, and other scholars, have.

CHAPTER 13

After the Storm

The Aftermath of Guatemala's Post–Civil War

ANNA BELINDA SANDOVAL GIRÓN

IN 2002 HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR LAUNCHED AGGRESSIVE ANTIGANG OPERATIONS, popularly referred to as *mano dura*,[1] to control what is considered one of the most virulent problems in Central America: youth gangs. In the case of gangs, *mano dura* refers to aggressive legislature lengthening prison terms coupled with sting operations meant to neutralize the influence of gangs. Guatemala soon followed suit. The laws passed in Guatemala do not match the mano dura approach of its neighbors, and yet the consequences of conceptualizing gangs as a regional issue have had an impact on Guatemala. This new surge of postconflict violence in Guatemala has come almost a decade after the 1996 signing of the Peace Treaties that sought to end a thirty-year war and create a democratic society. Guatemalans lived through a Peace Process that ended a thirty-year civil war and opened the country to a democratic transition. Yet these treaties failed to change the forces that continue to shape the unequal distribution of wealth and resources in society. The state now faces the challenge of dealing with the growing influence of transnational gang networks engaged in an array of criminal activities, while being unable to deliver the promised changes of the Peace Treaties. Gangs and drug trafficking have become the new enemies of the state, and the state has responded in full force by continuing to use repressive measures and fear to control the civilian population. The U.S. involvement in gang prevention is fueled by the desire to create stable democracies in Central America. This internal stability provides the opportunity for U.S. corporations to enter the markets and take advantage of the Free Trade Agreements (i.e., CAFTA-DR).

In this chapter I explore the effects that violence prevention programs and antigang policies have on the ways Guatemalans understand and challenge postwar social violence. While different groups of Guatemalans and the international community agree that violence is a problem, explanations—and hence actions—are informed by class position, gender, and geographical location. State policy is shaped by the dominant-class ideology and interests, which have